

Soft Target Security Brief

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⚠️ PREPAREDNESS CONDITION 3 - BROWN SKY ⚠️

The UK designated the IRGC and HAYI under new state-threat powers on 13-JUL, criminalising support with penalties to 14 years and sabotage to life. The next convergence is 11-SEP: Rosh Hashanah eve falls on the 25th anniversary of 9/11, two days after the Al-Saadi trial date. STSB-001 KH/HAYI: NSTR, still awaiting 09-SEP. NTAS: no current advisory, confirmed 14-AUG.

COMMUNICATIONS CONDITION: COMCON 4 - WATCH

See DTR Full CYB-001 for full detail.

SEASONAL: HIGH HOLY DAYS CONVERGE WITH THE 9/11 25TH ANNIVERSARY - 28 DAYS OUT

Rosh Hashanah begins at sundown on Friday 11-SEP-2026 and ends at nightfall on Sunday 13-SEP. That eve is the 25th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Yom Kippur runs sundown Sunday 20-SEP to nightfall Monday 21-SEP; Sukkot follows 25-SEP to 02-OCT. Al-Saadi is due in SDNY on 09-SEP, two days before Rosh Hashanah eve. This is the densest convergence of symbolic date, mass congregation and adversary calendar tripwire in the STSB tracking horizon, and it is 28 days out. Institutions that deferred hardening through the summer have four weeks.

ISSUE PARAMETERS

Publication (UTC)	14 AUG 2026 / 1530 UTC
Reporting Period	02-JUL through 14-AUG 2026 (Issue 10 - Issue 11 window, 43 days)
Issue	Vol. 1, Issue 11 Supersedes Vol. 1, Issue 10 (02 Jul 2026)
SOP / Registry	SOP v5.64 Addendum Master Source Registry v2.25 (59 mandatory) ICD 203/206 per §0.113
NTAS Status	NO CURRENT ADVISORY as of 14-AUG. The most recent bulletin has expired.

STANDING POSTURE - HOUSES OF WORSHIP / JEWISH INSTITUTIONS

The following mitigations remain in force from prior cycles regardless of whether a specific credible threat is identified this week:

- Vehicle standoff at all entrances - bollards, planters, or law-enforcement presence at drop-off points. A vehicle is the lowest-skill, highest-lethality tool available to a solo attacker.
- Child-area and youth-program access control - sign-in procedures, adult escort requirements, and staff-to-child ratios enforced at all times. The Al-Saadi indictment language included Jewish "schools" as a target category.
- HVAC intake audit - air intake locations mapped and access controlled. UK institutional hardening toward chemical-exposure kits signals UK CT assessment treats this vector as plausible.
- Mail and package intake protocol - all incoming packages screened before entering the interior. Train staff to identify IED precursor characteristics.
- FBI JTTF liaison - if your synagogue or JCC does not have an established FBI field office liaison, establish it now. Commissioner Tisch's statement that she has not seen a threat environment like this in 18 years of government was made at a synagogue security briefing - that briefing pipeline exists; access it.
- Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) FY2026 - ADL secured a \$30M increase in NSGP funding for FY2026. Apply if you have not already done so. Funding covers physical security hardening, cameras, access control, and training.

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT

Three things define your security calculus this cycle:

1. The UK criminalised support for the IRGC and HAYI on 13-JUL under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026. Support carries up to 14 years; sabotage including arson on behalf of a designated body carries life. It is the largest legal change to this threat environment since the campaign began in March 2026. See STSB-002.
2. The threat dispersed rather than stopped: four dated incidents against Jewish targets in this 43-day window, on three continents, none at a flagship venue and none claimed by HAYI. The next convergence is 11-SEP, when Rosh Hashanah eve falls on the 25th anniversary of 9/11, two days after Al-Saadi is due in SDNY. See STSB-003.
3. The incident baseline is unchanged: no ADL audit newer than 06-MAY-2026 exists. The METHOD MIX changed. Three of the four new incidents were low-skill solo acts by apparently unaffiliated individuals - an imitation firearm outside Shabbat services in Sydney, an assault on a father and his three-year-old in a London park, a brick through a Sarasota synagogue window. Plan against the unaffiliated individual, not only the directed network. No current NTAS advisory is in force as of 14-AUG; its absence should not be read as a green indicator.

SOURCES: DOJ Northern District of Georgia (four federal antisemitic-threat prosecutions, 13-JUL) - [DOJ NDGa](#) | GOV.UK Home Office (IRGC/IMCR/GRU state-threat designation, 13-JUL) - [GOV.UK](#) | Sarasota Police Department via Times of Israel (Chabad SRQ arrest, 29-JUL) - [Sarasota PD](#) | ADL (Sydney Chabad Double Bay, 04-JUL; decade of synagogue attacks) - [ADL](#) | DHS/HSToday (NTAS under-management) - [HSToday](#)

CURRENT ACTIVE THREATS - 14 AUG 2026

STSB-001 | KH-HAYI US network: NSTR on the case; 09-SEP trial now 26 days out.

BACKGROUND | NSTR | 48

WHY THIS CYCLE

The 09-SEP trial date is now 26 days out and falls two days before Rosh Hashanah eve. No case movement was identified in a 43-day window.

SUMMARY

One named senior Kata'ib Hizballah commander (Al-Saadi) remains in SDNY custody on an 8-count indictment covering a disrupted plot against a Manhattan synagogue plus Jewish centers in LA and Scottsdale, and roughly 20 attacks across Europe/Canada. Case status, custody posture, and the 09-SEP trial date are all unchanged from Issue 9 (12-JUN).

SALUTE

SIZE: One named senior KH commander (Al-Saadi) in federal custody, SDNY. Plot scope: simultaneous attacks on a Manhattan synagogue plus Jewish centers in Los Angeles and Scottsdale AZ. Network scope: 20-plus attacks across Europe and Canada. Parent FTO Kata'ib Hizballah: 7,000-10,000 members.

ACTIVITY: NSTR. No hearing, filing, superseding indictment or custody change is visible in open source across the 43-day window. The operative record stands at: 02-JUN arraignment, NOT GUILTY plea, 8-count indictment superseding the original 6-count complaint, defense mounting a political-prisoner and prisoner-of-war framing, prosecutors warning the case may widen.

LOCATION: Manhattan federal court (SDNY). Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn -- defendant held without bail. Collateral at-large cells: Amsterdam, Paris, London, Skopje.

TIME: Next court date 09-SEP-2026, last confirmed 02-JUL. 26 days out. Rosh Hashanah eve falls 11-SEP, two days later.

EQUIPMENT: No change. Prior-cycle detail (crypto down payment, seized electronic devices) stands as the operative record.

UNIT: FBI New York JTTF; SDNY prosecutors (Jay Clayton); NYPD; DOJ National Security Division. Defense: Andrew Dalack.

Analyst Assessment

NO CHANGE on the case across 43 days. **CHANGED AROUND IT:** the UK designated the IRGC and HAYI on 13-JUL, and the network has now lost its most permissive European operating environment. That matters to the US picture because the disrupted US cell was resourced and directed from the same structure. No new HAYI claim against a US target was identified.

LIKELIHOOD: A further KH/HAYI-linked attempt against a US Jewish or pro-Israel soft target over the next 60 days: **ROUGHLY EVEN CHANCE**. **CONFIDENCE: MODERATE**.

Unchanged from prior cycle. The network demonstrated intent, funding and sustained European tempo, and the disrupted US cell does not by itself indicate the broader network has stood down. The trial date

	is a plausible focal point for a response, and it sits immediately before the highest-attendance days in the Jewish calendar. CHANGE FROM PRIOR: PRIOR (Issue 10, 02-JUL): no case movement, 09-SEP next date. CURRENT (Issue 11, 14-AUG): still no case movement across 43 days; the surrounding legal environment changed substantially with the UK designations of 13-JUL. Likelihood unchanged. No case movement identified; likelihood judgment unchanged. TRIPWIRES: (1) Any new HAYI claim or KH-attributed attack; (2) identification of a second US-based cell; (3) a change in Al-Saadi custody posture or a trial-date continuance; (4) an Iranian state statement endorsing retaliation; (5) 09-SEP court date developments; (6) any network response timed to the High Holy Days or the 9/11 anniversary. COLLECTION GAPS: Identity and location of US-based cells beyond Al-Saadi; whether Al-Saadi has cooperated with the FBI; current HAYI operational leadership succession; whether any sealed docket activity has occurred, which would not be visible in open source.
ALT HYP	ALT A: The network attempts another US or Western soft-target attack within the near term. [roughly even chance] INDETERMINATE -- no new US attempt confirmed this cycle. ✓ Supporting Evidence: Documented 20-plus attack European/Canada campaign; demonstrated funding and tradecraft; active parent FTO; distributed network resilient to single-node arrest. ✗ Ruling-Out Evidence: Most advanced known US cell disrupted pre-attack; elevated FBI/JTTF surveillance; no new HAYI claim identified this cycle.
SOURCES	DOJ/SDNY (8-count indictment): justice.gov ADL: adl.org CBS New York: cbsnews.com Time: time.com

STSB-002 UK designates IRGC and HAYI 13-JUL: support 14 years, sabotage life.		WATCH UPDATED 58
WHY THIS CYCLE	The UK criminalised support for the IRGC and HAYI on 13-JUL, the largest legal change to this environment since the campaign began. A second consecutive window passed with no new claimed HAYI attack.	
SUMMARY	The National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 received royal assent on 08-JUL. On 13-JUL the Home Secretary laid draft regulations designating the IRGC, the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right (IMCR, the formulation the UK uses for HAYI) and Russia GRU Volunteer Corps as the first bodies under the new powers. Membership, support, inviting support, or displaying symbols or uniforms becomes an offence carrying up to 14 years; sabotage including arson on behalf of a designated body carries life imprisonment. Prosecutors no longer need to prove a direct foreign-power connection in every case. This is designation, NOT proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, because a state body cannot be proscribed by another state - materially similar in effect, different in legal mechanism. UK national threat level: not confirmed for this issue and therefore not stated. Two consecutive windows have passed with no new claimed HAYI attack. A 02-JUN Golders Green stairwell arson (unclaimed, no arrest) and a Dutch court update on the Rotterdam firebombing case are the only new developments.	
SALUTE	SIZE: Three bodies designated 13-JUL: IRGC, IMCR/HAYI, GRU Volunteer Corps. Roughly 37 arrests across the HAYI investigation to date. Arson-linked sites unchanged: Golders Green, Finchley, Kenton, Tower Hamlets, Whitechapel. UK national threat level: not confirmed for this issue. ACTIVITY: NSTR on a new CLAIMED HAYI attack for a second consecutive window. Two new UNCLAIMED incidents, both 04-JUL: Tottenham, London, where a man in his twenties and his three-year-old son were assaulted in Markfield Park by a suspect who made threatening remarks about the victims and the wider Jewish community; and Sydney, Australia, where two suspects were arrested and charged after allegedly pointing an imitation firearm at congregants gathered outside Chabad Double Bay following Shabbat morning services. Carried from Issue 10: 02-JUN Golders Green, an empty pram deliberately set alight in a majority-Jewish apartment building stairwell; residents extinguished it themselves; no arrest, Met Police motive undetermined. Dutch court proceedings (09-JUN) on the Rotterdam synagogue firebombing: six suspects (17-23) allegedly paid EUR3,000 to plant explosives -- a legal-track update, not a new attack.	

	LOCATION: Greater London: Tottenham, Markfield Park (04-JUL). Sydney, Australia: Double Bay (04-JUL), the first incident in this series outside Europe and North America. European nodes unchanged: Amsterdam, Paris, Rotterdam, Skopje, Belgium, Germany. TIME: Arson-and-arrest cycle running since late March 2026. Most recent dated incidents: 04-JUL, Tottenham and Sydney. Royal assent 08-JUL; designations laid before Parliament 13-JUL; Commons approved, Lords consideration followed. Designations take effect on parliamentary approval. EQUIPMENT: No change from prior cycle: accelerant arson, edged weapons, vehicles remain the documented method set. UNIT: UK Home Office (Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood). Counter Terrorism Policing London. Metropolitan Police. New South Wales Police (Sydney). Dutch prosecutors (Rotterdam case).
Analyst Assessment	CHANGED: the UK designations of 13-JUL. ADDED: two unclaimed incidents, Tottenham and Sydney, both 04-JUL. UNCONFIRMED: the UK national threat level, last published as SEVERE and not confirmed for this issue. LIKELIHOOD: Continued HAYI/KH-linked soft-target activity in Europe over the next 30 days: LIKELY. CONFIDENCE: MODERATE. <i>Held at LIKELY across a second quiet window rather than downgraded further. Two windows without a claimed attack is a real signal, and the designations raise the cost of participation sharply for local criminal proxies - which is the recruitment base the campaign depends on. But the Tottenham and Sydney incidents show the underlying targeting persists without the claim, and a campaign that stops claiming is not the same as a campaign that stops. Absence of a claim is weaker evidence than absence of an attack: unclaimed incidents surface late and inconsistently, and the campaign has resumed after previous quiet periods.</i> LIKELIHOOD: An equivalent network-linked executed attack on US soil within the next 30 days: UNLIKELY. CONFIDENCE: MODERATE. <i>Unchanged from prior cycle.</i> CHANGE FROM PRIOR: PRIOR (Issue 10, 02-JUL): no new claimed attack; European likelihood LIKELY/MODERATE; UK threat level SEVERE. CURRENT (Issue 11, 14-AUG): UK designation of the IRGC and HAYI on 13-JUL; two new unclaimed incidents including the first in Australia; UK threat level withdrawn for want of a verifiable source. No new claimed attack identified; likelihood downgraded to LIKELY/MODERATE, flagged as tentative. TRIPWIRES: (1) A chemical or mass-casualty escalation; (2) a new HAYI claim or KH-linked attack on US soil; (3) identification of a US-based cell beyond Al-Saadi; (4) a UK threat-level change; (5) a Met Police statement on the Golders Green motive; (6) a first HAYI claim against a North American target; (7) parliamentary approval or challenge of the 13-JUL designations. COLLECTION GAPS: Golders Green motive and suspect status; current UK national threat level; current total UK arrest and charge count; Tottenham and Sydney suspect affiliations beyond the initial charging statements; whether any HAYI claim was lodged and went unreported.
ALT HYP	ALT A: The pause in claimed attacks reflects a genuine reduction in directed campaign tempo. [likely] PARTIALLY OBSERVED -- two consecutive windows without a claimed attack, now with a legal regime that materially raises the cost of proxy recruitment. ✓ Supporting Evidence: No claimed attack across two consecutive windows after a near-continuous cadence since March; roughly 37 arrests; the 13-JUL designations criminalise the support relationship the campaign runs on; sustained international pressure may be degrading operational tempo. ✗ Ruling-Out Evidence: Two unclaimed incidents on 04-JUL show targeting continuing without attribution, which is what a campaign shedding its claim signature would look like; unclaimed incidents surface late, so a quiet period is provisional; the campaign has paused and resumed before.
SOURCES	Wikipedia: 2026 London Antisemitic Attacks ADL: adl.org LBC: lbc.co.uk

WHY THIS CYCLE	The September convergence is 28 days out: Rosh Hashanah eve falls on the 25th anniversary of 9/11, two days after the Al-Saadi trial date.
SUMMARY	Three dates converge in September. Al-Saadi is due in SDNY on 09-SEP. Rosh Hashanah begins at sundown on Friday 11-SEP and ends at nightfall on Sunday 13-SEP, so the eve falls on the 25th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Yom Kippur runs sundown Sunday 20-SEP to nightfall Monday 21-SEP, and Sukkot follows 25-SEP to 02-OCT. High Holy Day services are the highest-attendance days in the Jewish calendar, drawing congregants who do not attend at any other time, into buildings whose normal access control is calibrated for a fraction of that number, with overflow seating and long queues outside the security perimeter. The 9/11 anniversary independently raises symbolic value for both jihadist-inspired and domestic violent extremist actors, and a quarter-century anniversary carries more weight than an ordinary one. Separately, the four incidents recorded in this window - Sydney 04-JUL, Tottenham 04-JUL, Sarasota 29-JUL, and the Atlanta federal threat prosecutions announced 13-JUL - were all low-skill acts by apparently unaffiliated individuals rather than directed cells. That is the profile most likely to act on a symbolic date, because it requires no network, no funding and no travel.
SALUTE	SIZE: Four dated incidents against Jewish targets in the 43-day window, on three continents: Sydney 04-JUL, Tottenham 04-JUL, Sarasota 29-JUL, plus four federal antisemitic-threat prosecutions announced in Atlanta 13-JUL. Three convergent September dates: 09-SEP, 11-13 SEP, 20-21 SEP. Congregation size on High Holy Days routinely runs several times normal Shabbat attendance. Prior-cycle fireworks, 1M+ expected spectators, 5,000 National Guard. ACTIVITY: 04-JUL, SYDNEY: two suspects arrested and charged after allegedly pointing an imitation firearm at congregants gathered outside Chabad Double Bay following Shabbat morning services. 04-JUL, TOTTENHAM, LONDON: a man in his twenties and his three-year-old son assaulted in Markfield Park; the suspect made threatening remarks about the victims and the wider Jewish community. 29-JUL, SARASOTA FL: Brayton Laschinger, 30, arrested for throwing a brick through the window of Chabad of Downtown SRQ at approximately 0600; police classified it a hate crime and reported he attributed his motivation to social-media content. 13-JUL, ATLANTA: the US Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia announced four federal prosecutions for interstate antisemitic threats, including the 09-JUL arrest of Jordan Nicholas Hadley. LOCATION: Sydney, Australia (Double Bay). London (Tottenham). Sarasota, Florida. Atlanta, Georgia (federal prosecutions). New York (SDNY, 09-SEP). The exposure for September is not geographically concentrated: it is every synagogue, JCC and Jewish day school running High Holy Day services, and every site marking the 9/11 anniversary. Prior-cycle hostts). TIME: 09-SEP: Al-Saadi due in SDNY, 26 days out. 11-SEP sundown to 13-SEP nightfall: Rosh Hashanah; the eve is the 25th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. 20-SEP sundown to 21-SEP nightfall: Yom Kippur. 25-SEP to 02-OCT: Sukkot, which moves observance outdoors into temporary structures with no access control at all. EQUIPMENT: Documented method set this window: imitation firearm, physical assault, thrown brick, interstate threatening communications. No firearm, explosive or accelerant attack against a Jewish institution was identified in this window. Vehicle standoff, access control and mail screening remain the standing mitigations in the posture block above. UNIT: Sarasota Police Department; New South Wales Police; Metropolitan Police; FBI; DOJ Northern District of Georgia (US Attorney Hertzberg); DOJ Civil Rights Division; DHS; Secure Community Network; ADL.
Analyst Assessment	The pattern worth acting on is the method mix. Every incident this window was a low-skill solo act by an apparently unaffiliated individual, and the Sarasota suspect attributed his motivation to social-media content rather than to any organisation. That profile needs no network, no funding and no travel, which makes it the profile most likely to act on a symbolic date. High Holy Day services are where it meets the largest congregations of the year. LIKELIHOOD: At least one antisemitic incident at or near a US Jewish institution during the High Holy Day period, 11-SEP to 21-SEP: VERY LIKELY. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. <i>The ADL 2025 audit recorded 1,129 incidents against Jewish institutions in a year, an average well above one per day, and this window alone produced three institution-directed incidents plus four federal threat prosecutions. The base rate alone carries this; the convergence raises it. This judgement is about incidents, not mass casualties, and the two should not be read together.</i> LIKELIHOOD: A bomb threat, swatting call or evacuation-forcing hoax against one or more US synagogues during the High Holy Day period: LIKELY. CONFIDENCE: MODERATE.

Based on the historical base rate for hoax-call volume against Jewish institutions around High Holy Days and the four interstate-threat prosecutions in this window alone. No specific intelligence beyond the base rate. Institutions should rehearse the hoax response now: a threat that empties a building into an unscreened car park can be the attack rather than a distraction from it.

LIKELIHOOD: A successful mass-casualty attack against a US Jewish institution during the High Holy Day period: **UNLIKELY**. **CONFIDENCE: MODERATE**.

The most advanced known US cell was disrupted pre-attack and remains in custody; no specific credible threat has been identified by DHS or the FBI; no current NTAS advisory is in force. Set against that: the ADL audit records three antisemitic murders in 2025 and 32 assaults involving a deadly weapon, so the tail is real even where the central case is not.

CHANGE FROM PRIOR: PRIOR (Issue 10, 02-JUL): summer mass-gathering tracking. CURRENT (Issue 11, 14-AUG): the summer windows closed without a mass-casualty event and this code now tracks the September convergence. The September convergence is the successor pressure point and it is denser, because the symbolic date and the mass gathering fall on the same day rather than in the same season.

TRIPWIRES: (1) Any DHS or FBI joint bulletin naming High Holy Days or the 9/11 anniversary; (2) reinstatement of an NTAS advisory; (3) a new HAYI claim, or a first HAYI claim against a North American target; (4) a continuance or change of venue in the 09-SEP proceeding; (5) any credible threat to a named congregation during the Days of Awe; (6) an attack at any large public gathering on the 9/11 anniversary, especially at an unscreened peripheral gathering point rather than a hardened ceremonial site.

COLLECTION GAPS: Whether DHS or the FBI have issued non-public bulletins to the Jewish community for the High Holy Day period; current Secure Community Network guidance for the 2026 High Holy Days; whether the Sarasota and Tottenham suspects have any network affiliation beyond the initial charging statements; current UK national threat level.

ALT HYP

ALT A: The September convergence passes without an attack on a US Jewish institution. [roughly even chance]

NOT YET OBSERVABLE -- the period is 28 days out.

✓ **Supporting Evidence:** The most advanced known US cell is disrupted and in custody; no current NTAS advisory; no directed attack on a US Jewish institution has succeeded since the campaign began; institutional hardening has been funded through a \$30M NSGP increase for FY2026.

✗ **Ruling-Out Evidence:** Three institution-directed incidents occurred in this window alone without any convergence to prompt them; the ADL audit records 1,129 institution-directed incidents in a single year; the unaffiliated-individual profile that produced every incident this window requires no capability that hardening reliably defeats.

ALT B: A directed KH/HAYI-linked attack is timed to the 09-SEP proceeding or the High Holy Days. [unlikely]

NOT OBSERVED -- no specific credible threat identified by DHS or the FBI as of this writing.

✓ **Supporting Evidence:** The network has demonstrated intent, funding and a documented 20-plus attack campaign; a trial of a senior commander is exactly the kind of focal point such networks have used; European cells remain at large in Amsterdam, Paris, London and Skopje. Historical FTO and DVE interest in symbolic dates persists across the tournament.

✗ **Ruling-Out Evidence:** The 13-JUL UK designations sharply raise the cost of proxy recruitment in the network most permissive theatre; no claimed HAYI attack has occurred across two consecutive windows; no HAYI claim has ever been lodged against a North American target; DHS and the FBI state no credible threat is being tracked.

SOURCES

[GOV.UK Home Office](#) | [Times of Israel](#) | [KQED](#) | [KRON4](#) | [DOJ Northern District of Georgia](#) | [Sarasota Police Department](#) | [DHS NTAS \(dhs.gov/ntas\)](#) | [ADL](#) | [HSToday](#) | [The Hill](#) | [Flashpoint](#) | [CSIS](#) | [Unit 42](#) | [Chabad.org High Holidays 2026 calendar](#) (High Holy Day dates; cross-check against your own congregation schedule)

CONTEXTUAL BASELINE - ANTISEMITIC THREAT ENVIRONMENT

ADL 2025 Audit of Antisemitic Incidents - Released 06-MAY-2026

This remains the most recent ADL annual audit; no newer release exists as of 14-AUG-2026. It is the current operative baseline for the standing synagogue, JCC and Jewish-institution threat picture. Key findings:

- 6,274 total antisemitic incidents in 2025 - average 17 per day. 33% decrease from 2024 but the third-highest year since ADL began tracking in 1979; five times higher than a decade ago.
- 203 physical assaults - the highest assault count ADL has ever recorded. Up 4% from 2024.
- 32 assaults involving a deadly weapon - up 39% from 23 in 2024.
- Three people killed in antisemitic attacks in 2025 - first antisemitic murder year since 2019. Incidents: Capital Jewish Museum shooting DC (two Israeli Embassy staffers), Boulder CO Molotov attack (Run for Their Lives event, one killed), Pennsylvania Governor Shapiro residence firebombing.
- 1,129 antisemitic incidents targeted Jewish institutions specifically in 2025.
- ADL secured a \$30M increase in federal Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) funding for FY2026. Institutions that have not applied should do so; with the High Holy Days 28 days out, physical hardening funded now will not be installed in time, so the practical value between now and 11-SEP is in guard hours and training rather than construction.
- Companion legislation: Jewish American Security Act introduced in Senate (Senators Rosen and Lankford) 19-MAY-2026. Monitor for Congressional action.

NTAS STATUS NOTE: No current NTAS advisory is in force as of 14-AUG and the most recent bulletin has expired. The NTAS website has been under-managed since a February 2026 funding lapse per HSToday reporting, so the absence of an advisory is weak evidence about the threat environment and should not be read as a green indicator. The June 22, 2025 bulletin (Iran conflict / heightened threat environment, expires September 22, 2025) is the last advisory in the public record. The absence of an NTAS advisory does not indicate the threat environment has normalized; it indicates the public-facing advisory system has not been updated in the current conflict environment. Operators should not use NTAS silence as a green indicator.

SOURCES: [ADL 2025 Audit of Antisemitic Incidents](#) (06-MAY-2026) - [ADL: Jewish American Security Act welcome](#) - [HSToday: NTAS under-management](#) - JTA, Jewish Insider, CBS New York: ADL audit coverage

CALENDAR HORIZON - NEXT 60 DAYS (ALL FOUR DATES FALL INSIDE IT)

Key dates for STSB tracking:

- 09 SEP 2026: Al-Saadi next court date, SDNY. 26 days out. Monitor for any network response timed to this date.
- 11-13 SEP 2026: Rosh Hashanah, sundown Friday 11-SEP to nightfall Sunday 13-SEP. The eve falls on the 25th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. The highest-attendance days in the Jewish calendar converging with the highest-symbolism date in the US calendar.
- 20-21 SEP 2026: Yom Kippur, sundown Sunday 20-SEP to nightfall Monday 21-SEP. Kol Nidre and Neilah are the two densest gatherings of the year.
- 25 SEP - 02 OCT 2026: Sukkot. Observance moves outdoors into temporary structures with no access control, on public-facing ground. The most exposed week of the fall calendar and the one most often left out of hardening plans.

ANALYTICAL STANDARDS & SOURCING

This product is produced in conformance with ICD 203 (Analytic Standards) and ICD 206 (Sourcing Requirements). Likelihood and confidence are stated as separate dimensions on every forward-looking judgment. Likelihood uses the estimative ladder (almost no chance, very unlikely, unlikely, roughly even chance, likely, very likely, almost certain); confidence is HIGH, MODERATE, or LOW. Every scored entry carries a minimum of two alternative hypotheses with supporting and disconfirming evidence.

Analytical standards: fortunefavorstheprepared.com/analytical-standards | **Source registry:** fortunefavorstheprepared.com/dtr-source-registry

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