

COMMS WATCH

Communications Infrastructure • Spectrum • Electronic Warfare • Public Safety Comms
Vol. 1, Issue 1 | Week of 04 April 2026 | Fortune Favors the Prepared

⚠️ PREPAREDNESS CONDITION: PREP-CON 3 — HEIGHTENED READINESS
Active US-Iran armed conflict, Hormuz shipping disruption, and elevated domestic critical infrastructure threat posture sustain PREP-CON 3.

COMMUNICATIONS CONDITION: COMCON 4 — ELEVATED
GPS/GNSS jamming active across Middle East theater • Starlink disruption in conflict zones • Public safety spectrum enforcement events • Elevated EW posture

Publication Date	04 April 2026
Reporting Period	29 March — 04 April 2026
PREP-CON Assessment	PREP-CON 3 — Heightened Readiness (Brown)
COMCON Assessment	COMCON 4 — Elevated (theater GPS jamming, Starlink disruption, EW posture)
Solar Flux (SFI)	148 Kp Index: 2 (QUIET) SWPC Outlook: Unsettled 05–06 Apr
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT // FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
Producer	Fortune Favors the Prepared fortunefavorstheprepared.com

SECTION 1 | SIGNAL WATCH BRIEF

The dominant communications story this week is the intersection of active electronic warfare in the Middle East theater and its cascading effects on civilian and commercial communications infrastructure. GPS/GNSS spoofing and jamming campaigns confirmed by EUROCONTROL and GPSJam.org data affect aviation and maritime navigation across the eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Strait of Hormuz corridor. Starlink service degradation in conflict-adjacent zones (Iraq, Syria, eastern Ukraine) continues, attributed to Iranian-supplied and Russian EW assets. Domestically, two FCC enforcement actions in Pennsylvania affect the amateur and public safety communities. HF propagation is in a quiet solar phase with generally favorable conditions on 40m and 20m for NVIS and regional emergency net operations. No major terrestrial backbone events this cycle. GPS-dependent infrastructure operators — maritime, aviation, energy, and logistics — should confirm INS/alternate navigation cross-reference procedures are current.

SECTION 2 | PROPAGATION CONDITIONS

Solar Flux Index (SFI): 148 | **Kp Index:** 2 (QUIET) | **SWPC 3-Day Outlook:** Unsettled conditions possible 05–06 April; no major geomagnetic storm watch in effect.

BAND	STATUS	CONDITIONS
80m / 75m	GOOD	Regional NVIS reliable nights through early morning. Primary ARES/RACES net band. Propagation window: 2200–1000 local.
60m	GOOD	Channel frequencies available for emergency traffic; ITU coordination required outside US.
40m	GOOD	Primary daytime regional band. Reliable 200–1000 mile paths. Strong for afternoon emergency net check-ins.
20m	FAIR	DX capable daytime; patchy in late afternoon. Cross-country paths usable. Not reliable for NVIS.
17m	FAIR	Variable. Long-skip predominant; limited regional utility.
15m	POOR	Marginal daytime opening only. Not recommended for emergency traffic this cycle.
10m	POOR	Below threshold for reliable use. Sporadic-E possible; plan around 40m/20m primary.
⚠ POLAR / TRANS-POLAR (all bands) — FAIR: Kp 2 allows reasonable trans-polar paths. Monitor for Kp exceedance forecast 05–06 April. Verify on-frequency before committing circuits.		

Operational implication: 40m is the primary workaround band if GPS-synchronized digital mode operations are disrupted by GNSS jamming. 80m is the backup for regional NVIS traffic. HFGCS 8.992 MHz (day) and 4.724 MHz (night) remain available for monitoring.

SECTION 3 | SATELLITE & SPACE WEATHER

SAT-001	Starlink Service Degradation — Middle East / Eastern Ukraine Theaters	NEW
TRACK	SATELLITE COMMS / ELECTRONIC WARFARE	
SUMMARY	SpaceX Starlink terminals in conflict-adjacent zones (Iraq, Syria, occupied eastern Ukraine) reporting intermittent to sustained service disruption. OSINT attribution points to Iranian-supplied EW assets in Iraq/Syria and Russian Krasukha-4 / Tirada-2 systems in eastern Ukraine. SpaceX firmware hardening has reduced vulnerability windows but has not eliminated disruption. Commercial maritime and NGO users in affected zones should plan for Starlink unavailability as a contingency.	
SOURCES	The War Zone C4ISRNET Bellingcat OSINT SpaceX Status	
ANALYST ASSESSMENT	Pattern consistent with targeted uplink jamming rather than constellation-level failure. Probability HIGH that disruption continues through current conflict phase. Commercial operators in theater: treat Starlink as degraded primary, not reliable backup.	
ALT HYP	ALT A: SpaceX Firmware Update Causing Intermittent Resets [LOW] Firmware patch cycle could produce transient terminal disconnects resembling jamming. Supporting Evidence: Timing and geography of outages inconsistent with a global firmware rollout — concentrated in conflict-adjacent zones only. Ruling-Out Evidence: SpaceX confirms firmware push coinciding with outage window. Outages reported outside conflict zones simultaneously.	
	ALT B: Ground-Based Infrastructure Damage to Starlink Terminals [POSSIBLE — Secondary] Kinetic strikes on facilities housing Starlink ground equipment could cause localized service loss.	

	<p>Supporting Evidence: Pattern of outage in areas with confirmed kinetic activity. Infrastructure damage and jamming are not mutually exclusive.</p> <p>Ruling-Out Evidence: Outage pattern is geographically fixed rather than correlated with EW asset movement. SpaceX reports terminal hardware losses.</p>
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SAT-002	GPS/GNSS Spoofing — Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Hormuz Corridor	NEW
TRACK	SATELLITE COMMS / GPS-GNSS / ELECTRONIC WARFARE	
SUMMARY	EUROCONTROL GNSS NOTAMs and GPSJam.org heatmap data confirm active GPS/GNSS spoofing and jamming across eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus FIR, Iraqi and Iranian airspace, Persian Gulf, and Strait of Hormuz approaches. Aviation operators reporting position errors and CDU anomalies. Maritime: AIS track anomalies detected via Windward and Lloyd's List Intelligence in Hormuz corridor consistent with spoofed position broadcast. Energy infrastructure operators using GPS-synchronized SCADA timing should verify PTP/NTP backup synchronization sources are active.	
SOURCES	EUROCONTROL GNSS NOTAMs GPSJam.org USCG NAVCEN GUIDE Tool Windward AIS Lloyd's List Intelligence	
ANALYST ASSESSMENT	Confirmed state-actor GPS denial campaign consistent with Iranian and Russian EW doctrine. Cross-sector impact: MARITIME LOGISTICS, ENERGY (SCADA timing), and AVIATION are all affected. Expect continuation for duration of current conflict phase. Domestic GPS infrastructure not currently affected; watch for spillover if conflict escalates.	
ALT HYP	<p>ALT A: Uncoordinated Multi-Actor Jamming — Not Coordinated Campaign [POSSIBLE]</p> <p>Iran and Russia both possess independent GPS jamming capability and have separate operational rationale for employment. No confirmed deconfliction mechanism between IRGC and Russian EW units.</p> <p>Supporting Evidence: Geographic overlap of jamming footprints without confirmed coordination is consistent with independent employment producing compounding effects.</p> <p>Ruling-Out Evidence: Simultaneous jamming activation/deactivation across both IRGC and Russian theater consistent only with coordination. SIGINT confirms shared frequency plan or timing protocol.</p>	
ALT HYP	<p>ALT B: Testing New EW Capability Rather Than Operational Employment [LOW]</p> <p>State actors sometimes use conflict environments to test new jamming systems under live conditions with plausible deniability.</p> <p>Supporting Evidence: No observable signature distinguishing capability testing from operational employment. Scale and persistence of jamming is operationally motivated.</p> <p>Ruling-Out Evidence: Episodic activation with variable power levels inconsistent with operational disruption intent. ELINT captures novel waveforms not previously attributed to either actor.</p>	

SAT-003	DirecTV / DISH / SiriusXM — No Service-Affecting Events This Cycle	CONTINUED
TRACK	SATELLITE COMMS	
SUMMARY	No significant outages or service disruptions reported for DirecTV, DISH Network, or SiriusXM this cycle. DirecTV's ongoing effort to acquire DISH continues to generate regulatory activity at FCC; no operational impact to subscribers expected near-term. SiriusXM nominal. GPS disruption in foreign theaters has no direct impact on domestic GEO satellite broadcast services.	
SOURCES	FCC ECFS Docket Search DirecTV Newsroom SiriusXM Status	

SECTION 4 | TERRESTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

TERR-001	FirstNet / AT&T — Operational Status	CONTINUED
TRACK	TERRESTRIAL CELLULAR / FIRSTNET	
SUMMARY	FirstNet reporting nominal operational status. No network-wide outages or interoperability failures identified this cycle. Band 14 spectrum preemption capability active across enrolled agencies. Recommend public safety agencies verify FirstNet priority and preemption is active on deployed devices ahead of potential domestic response requirements tied to elevated PREP-CON 3 posture.	
SOURCES	FirstNet Authority AT&T FirstNet APCO International	

TERR-002	Backbone / BGP — No Major Routing Events This Cycle	CONTINUED
TRACK	INFRASTRUCTURE / BACKBONE	
SUMMARY	No significant BGP routing anomalies or Internet Exchange Point outages identified via Kentik and RIPE NCC monitoring this cycle. Undersea cable status nominal; no new cut or repair events affecting North American or transatlantic capacity. Continue standard monitoring cadence.	
SOURCES	Kentik BGP Monitor RIPE NCC TeleGeography Submarine Cable Map	

SECTION 5 | ELECTRONIC WARFARE WATCH

EW-001	Iranian EW Posture — GPS Denial and SATCOM Jamming, Hormuz Theater	NEW
TRACK	ELECTRONIC WARFARE / SATELLITE	
SUMMARY	Iranian EW posture elevated concurrent with US-Iran armed conflict (Operation Epic Fury context). Assets assessed to include Samen-1 GPS jamming systems and Mersad-family SATCOM jamming equipment. Primary operational areas: Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz maritime approaches, and Iraqi airspace. Commercial SATCOM (Inmarsat, Iridium, Starlink) all reporting varying levels of disruption consistent with Iranian EW employment doctrine. US military EW suppression operations ongoing per OSINT sourcing; effectiveness partial.	

SOURCES	C4ISRNET The War Zone Bellingcat EUROCONTROL NOTAMs ARINC NOTAMs GPSJam.org
ANALYST ASSESSMENT	Iranian GPS denial capability assessed as capable of disrupting commercial aviation and maritime navigation in a 200–300nm radius from employment sites. Energy sector operators with GPS-synchronized SCADA timing in the Gulf region should implement NTP fallback immediately. Cross-reference: SAT-002 (GPS spoofing), MARITIME LOGISTICS.
ALT HYP	<p>ALT A: Russian EW Asset Transfer Increasing Iranian Capability Beyond Baseline [POSSIBLE]</p> <p>Russia has transferred military technology to Iran throughout the conflict period. Krasukha-series EW systems documented in Iranian inventory. Expanded jamming radius beyond prior Iranian baseline consistent with Russian hardware.</p> <p>Supporting Evidence: GPS spoofing footprint in this cycle extends further than prior assessed Iranian standalone capability. Some waveform characteristics consistent with Russian-origin systems.</p> <p>Ruling-Out Evidence: Iranian EW employment remains within prior assessed capability envelope. No intelligence community confirmation of active Russian EW personnel in theater.</p>
	<p>ALT B: Cyberspace Operations Augmenting Physical EW to Amplify Denial Effect [WATCH]</p> <p>Hybrid EW + cyber denial targeting GPS receiver firmware or networked navigation databases would amplify physical jamming effects at lower marginal cost.</p> <p>Supporting Evidence: Iran has demonstrated willingness to combine cyber and kinetic operations. GPS-adjacent systems (ECDIS, AIS, ACARS) are networked and independently vulnerable to compromise.</p> <p>Ruling-Out Evidence: No confirmed cyber exploitation of GPS-adjacent navigation systems this cycle. All observed effects attributable to physical RF jamming without cyber augmentation signature.</p>

SECTION 6 | PUBLIC SAFETY COMMS

PS-001	FCC NOV — KD3ASC Pittsburgh / BTech UV-Pro Inadvertent Retransmission	NEW
TRACK	PUBLIC SAFETY COMMS / FCC ENFORCEMENT	
SUMMARY	FCC Notice of Violation issued to KD3ASC (Pittsburgh, PA) for inadvertent retransmission of Allegheny County EMS dispatch frequency 470.4375 MHz via BTech UV-Pro "Audio Relay" feature. Radio equipment confiscated. The Audio Relay function — which retransmits received audio on a programmed output frequency — was apparently active while the unit was programmed to monitor emergency services frequencies. This constitutes unauthorized operation on Part 90 public safety spectrum in violation of 47 CFR §90.425.	
SOURCES	FCC Enforcement Bureau FCC License Search ARRL News	
ANALYST ASSESSMENT	This is an operational safety reminder for all amateur operators using multi-function HTs. The BTech UV-Pro, Baofeng UV-5R series, and similar radios with receive-retransmit or cross-band repeat features can inadvertently key up on monitored frequencies. Verify Audio Relay / Cross-Band Repeat is DISABLED if public safety or NOAA Weather frequencies (162.400–162.550 MHz) are programmed into the receive bank.	

COMPLIANCE REMINDER	Inhibit transmit on: NOAA Weather (162.400–162.550 MHz), public safety dispatch frequencies, and any Part 90 frequency for which you hold no authorization. FCC enforcement is active in the Pittsburgh area.
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PS-002	FCC Open Investigation — Antisemitic Broadcasts on Allegheny County Emergency Channels	NEW
TRACK	PUBLIC SAFETY COMMS / FCC ENFORCEMENT	
SUMMARY	FCC Enforcement Bureau has an open investigation into deliberate antisemitic broadcasts over Allegheny County emergency communications channels during March 2026. Incident represents intentional malicious interference with emergency services spectrum — a federal felony under 47 USC §333. Investigation ongoing; no arrest announced as of cycle close.	
SOURCES	FCC Enforcement Bureau FCC Complaints Portal Pittsburgh Post-Gazette	
ANALYST ASSESSMENT	Pattern of interference with public safety and emergency management channels is increasing nationally. ARES/RACES net control operators should document and immediately report any observed interference to the FCC (complaints.fcc.gov) and local law enforcement. Deliberate interference during an actual emergency response is a force-multiplier threat to public safety operations.	

SECTION 7 | FCC & REGULATORY PULSE

No new FCC rulemaking actions of immediate operational significance to emergency communicators identified this cycle beyond the enforcement actions covered in Section 6. FCC ECFS monitoring continues. NTIA spectrum allocation proceedings: no new actions affecting public safety or amateur spectrum this cycle.

SECTION 8 | AMATEUR RADIO CORNER

ARES / RACES Status:

No formal ARES/RACES activation reported this cycle. Recommend ARES Emergency Coordinators in regions with elevated PREP-CON 3 posture conduct a net readiness check and verify member Go-Kit HF capability — particularly 40m digital mode (Winlink) and phone — given potential for communications degradation if domestic situation escalates.

Operational Reminder — Programmed Frequency Discipline:

- Inhibit transmit on NOAA Weather frequencies (162.400–162.550 MHz) in capable transceivers.
- Do NOT enable Audio Relay / Cross-Band Repeat features if public safety or government frequencies are in your receive bank.
- Verify your FCC license is current and covers your operating frequencies. License lookup: wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/searchLicense.jsp
- **FCC enforcement is ACTIVE in the Pittsburgh PA area. Allegheny County frequencies are monitored.**

SECTION 9 | ANALYST NOTES

Cross-Track Assessment — GPS/GNSS as a Systemic Vulnerability:

The convergence of active GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing in the Middle East theater (SAT-002, EW-001) with the ongoing US-Iran armed conflict creates a systemic vulnerability profile that extends beyond the immediate theater. GPS underpins SCADA timing in energy infrastructure, AIS in maritime logistics, ACARS in aviation, and precision timing in financial transaction systems. A deliberate expansion of GPS denial operations toward regional US allies or US assets

in the theater could rapidly cascade into civilian infrastructure disruption. Domestic GPS-dependent operators should treat the current theater campaign as an operational readiness test: if your system cannot function with GPS denied or degraded, plan corrective action now.

Monitoring Priorities for Coming Week:

- SWPC Kp forecast 05–06 April — unsettled conditions could degrade HF NVIS and 20m paths.
- GPSJam.org heatmap — watch for geographic expansion of jamming footprint toward eastern Mediterranean air corridors.
- FCC Allegheny County investigation — watch for enforcement action announcement.
- FirstNet activation events if domestic law enforcement surge or mass casualty event triggers PREP-CON 2 escalation.
- Starlink operational status in theater — SpaceX firmware update cycle may temporarily alter disruption pattern.

END OF SIGNAL WATCH | Vol. 1, Issue 1 | 04 April 2026

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